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Confronting the Biased Algorithm:
The Danger of Admitting Facial
Recognition Technology Results
in the Courtroom
ABSTRACT
From unlocking an iPhone to Facebook “tags,” facial recognition
technology has become increasingly commonplace in modern society. In
the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement and call for police reform
in the United States, it is important now more than ever to consider the
implications of law enforcement’s use of facial recognition technology. A
study from the National Institute of Standards and Technology found
that facial recognition algorithms generated higher rates of false
positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more false
identifications—than white faces. Given the embedded bias of this
technology and its increased prevalence, the lack of federal regulation of
facial recognition technology and its uses by law enforcement are
alarming. This Note explores issues that arise with law enforcement’s
use of facial recognition technology and how results from the technology
should be treated in the criminal justice system.
This Note cautions against admitting results from facial
recognition technology into evidence in criminal trials based on the
current state of the industry and the technology. Further, if facial
recognition evidence is admitted, this Note argues that defendants
should have access to the software’s source code to meaningfully
challenge the evidence presented against them under the confrontation
clause of the US Constitution. While this Note recognizes developers’
interest in protecting trade secrets, it nevertheless recommends that
judges balance these interests with those of defendants and make
case-by-case decisions about how to protect developers’ information
without blocking defendants’ access to the software.
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Robert Julian-Borchak Williams, a Black man from Michigan,
was wrongfully arrested in January 2020 based on a flawed match from
facial recognition technology.1 Williams was minding his own business
at work when he received a call from law enforcement asking him to
come to the police station to be arrested. At first, he thought the call
was a prank.2 However, shortly after receiving this call, Williams was
arrested on his lawn in front of his wife and two daughters.3 The police
would not explain why Williams was being arrested; they merely
showed him a piece of paper reading “felony warrant” and “larceny”
alongside his driver’s license photo.4 When his wife asked where he was
being taken, an officer simply responded, “Google it.”5

1.
Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html
[https://perma.cc/7GBH-ZH6Q]
(last updated Aug. 3, 2020).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
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According to technology and legal experts, this may be the first
known account of an American being wrongfully arrested based
on a facial recognition algorithm.6 Williams was arrested after a
surveillance camera image of a man robbing a retail store was uploaded
to a facial recognition system and generated multiple matches with
Williams’s driver’s license photo among the results.7 The results were
shown to an eyewitness who had witnessed the crime five months prior
and she selected Williams as the “correct” match.8 Since Williams’s
arrest, US authorities have identified two other men wrongfully
arrested based on facial recognition technology results; in each of these
cases, the men mistakenly identified were Black.9 These recent
examples of police implementation of facial recognition technology raise
questions about the technology’s development and use.
The facial recognition technology that police departments
employ to identify suspects predominantly originates from private
companies. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
conducted a study in 2019 that evaluated 189 different algorithms from
99 developers, which represents the majority of the industry.10 The
study found that the algorithms generated higher rates of false
positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more
false identifications—than white faces.11 This study, and various
others, reveal the widespread bias embedded in facial recognition
technologies.12
In the context of the Black Lives Matter movement and call for
police reform in the United States, it is important to consider the
consequences of using biased facial recognition technology in law
enforcement. The inaccuracy of facial recognition technology raises
concerns about the potential disparate impact of this technology in law
enforcement and the justice system. With the increasing use of this
technology, it is likely that prosecutors will soon seek to introduce it
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
See id.
9.
Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition
Match, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html [https://perma.cc/HHW3-XJTD] (last updated Jan. 6, 2021).
10.
NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software, NAT’L
INST. STANDARDS & TECH. [hereinafter NIST Study], https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/
2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software
[https://perma.cc/
A94Z-DGSY] (last updated May 18, 2020).
11.
Hill, supra note 1.
12.
See id.; see also Joy Buolamwini, Opinion, When the Robot Doesn’t See Dark Skin, N.Y.
TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/opinion/facial-analysis-technologybias.html [https://perma.cc/6NA2-2YQU].
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into evidence at criminal trials to establish probable cause or as
evidence of an identification.13 Because this technology’s embedded bias
currently places minorities at a disadvantage in the criminal justice
system, courts should carefully examine the state of the technology, its
regulation, and consider what rights criminal defendants should have
if condemning facial recognition technology evidence is introduced.
This Note addresses whether results from facial recognition
technology should be admitted into evidence at trial and, if the results
are admitted, what rights defendants should have to challenge this
evidence. Part I gives background information on facial recognition
technology, its use by law enforcement, and the lack of regulation. Part
II examines whether results from facial recognition technology are
admissible as reliable scientific evidence under the Daubert factors and
analyzes the scope of defendants’ right to challenge the evidence if
admitted. Part III suggests that results from facial recognition
technology should not be admitted into evidence at trial based on the
Daubert factors and further recommends legislation that would grant
defendants access to the software used in their trials, with possible
protections for the software developer’s trade secrets.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Black Lives Matter Movement
The Black Lives Matter movement gained substantial traction
in the United States on May 25, 2020, when George Floyd, a
46-year-old Black man from Minneapolis, was killed by a Minneapolis
police officer.14 Police officers responded to a call that claimed Floyd
paid for a pack of cigarettes with a counterfeit $20 bill.15 Floyd allegedly
resisted the officers when they handcuffed him, resulting in a white
police officer pinning Floyd to the ground with his knee on Floyd’s
neck.16 Despite Floyd’s repeated cries, “I can’t breathe,” the officer did
not release his knee from Floyd’s neck for eight minutes and forty-six
seconds, resulting in Floyd’s death. Bystanders captured this encounter
on camera. Shortly after Floyd’s death, videos of the officer’s knee on

13.
Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where Will It Take
Us?, 34 AM. BAR ASS’N CRIM. JUST. MAG. (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
criminal_justice/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2019/spring/facial-recognition-technology/ [https://perma.cc/7K9B-JQGA].
14.
See What to Know About the Death of George Floyd in Minneapolis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/YS6E-4HRJ].
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
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Floyd’s neck sparked outrage across the United States; citizens across
the country took to the streets to protest police brutality and systemic
racism in the weeks and months that followed.17
However, Floyd’s death is not an isolated incident. Many in the
Black Lives Matter movement drew comparisons to the death of Eric
Garner. Garner was a Black man who died in police custody in New
York City in 2014 after an officer held him in a chokehold.18 Garner
repeatedly pleaded, “I can’t breathe.” Like Floyd, Garner’s death was
also video recorded by a bystander. This plea, “I can’t breathe,” has
become a rallying cry for the Black Lives Matter movement.19 Floyd and
Garner are only two of the large number of Black victims of police
brutality that have become the faces of the Black Lives Matter
movement.
The killings of George Floyd and Eric Garner demonstrate the
dangerous correlation between systemic racism and police brutality. As
the Black Lives Matter movement continues to publicly confront this
correlation, it is imperative to also confront the disparate impact of the
use of facial recognition technology in policing. As this technology
pervades our society, its embedded bias20 is problematic for minorities
who have historically been disproportionately targeted by law
enforcement.21 The potential for facial recognition technology to further
disadvantage minorities in the criminal justice system warrants a
deeper examination of police methodology for using the technology and
increased judicial scrutiny of its use as evidence in a criminal
proceeding.
B. Facial Recognition Technology Generally
The use of facial recognition technology is increasingly common
in modern society. Facial recognition is the process of comparing two

17.
Id.
18.
See Deborah Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York Man Dies After Chokehold by Police,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/justice/ny-chokehold-death/index.html [https://perma.cc/
KAD7-TGP7] (last updated Dec. 8, 2014, 5:31 PM).
19.
See id.; Benazir Wehelie & Amy Woodyatt, ‘I Can’t Breathe’: Hundreds Lie Down in
Protest, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/03/world/gallery/george-floyd-lie-down-intl-scli/index.html [https://perma.cc/R4VJ-47AR] (last updated June 4, 2020, 7:19 AM).
20.
See Hill, supra note 1 (describing a study that found that the algorithms generated
higher rates of false positives for Black faces—sometimes up to one hundred times more false
identifications—than Caucasian faces).
21.
See Drew Desilver, Michael Lipka & Dalia Fahmy, 10 Things We Know About Race
and Policing in the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2020/06/03/10-things-we-know-about-race-and-policing-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/
YK2Q-7NRM].
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images of faces to determine whether they represent the same person.22
Facial recognition technology operates by first recognizing a face and
then measuring its features.23 The algorithm identifies different
landmarks on a person’s face that can be quantified, such as distance
between the eyes, width of the nose, and depth of the eye sockets.24
After taking these measurements, the software uses these landmarks
to create a template to compare to preexisting images of known faces.25
The algorithm analyzes pairs of faces and generates a score reflecting
the similarity of the faces’ features.26 Facial recognition is probabilistic;
the technology produces more or less likely matches, not definitive
matches.27 These technologies “learn” over time as they are trained
through exposure to large amounts of data and begin to infer rules from
the patterns that emerge.28
C. Law Enforcement Use of Facial Recognition Technology
Facial recognition technology has proliferated many industries,
and law enforcement is no exception. Law enforcement facial
recognition networks include over 117 million American adults.29
Because facial recognition databases include so many Americans, it is
alarming that the use of this technology is essentially unregulated.
There are currently no federal statutes that govern the use of facial
recognition technology.30 Some state and local governments have
stepped in to regulate where Congress has not, but most of their
regulations have addressed general biometric information without
specifics on facial recognition technology.31
The Georgetown Law Center on Privacy and Technology
conducted a year-long investigation of police departments across the

22.
See Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up:
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/ [https://perma.cc/66QN-LUJ4].
23.
See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work, HOW
STUFF WORKS, https://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/high-tech-gadgets/facial-recognition.htm [https://perma.cc/8EQL-U4G8] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
24.
See id.
25.
See Hamann & Smith, supra note 13.
26.
See id.
27.
See Garvie et al., supra note 22.
28.
See Patrick W. Nutter, Comment, Machine Learning Evidence: Admissibility and
Weight, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 919, 927–28 (2019).
29.
Garvie et al., supra note 22.
30.
Elizabeth McClellan, Facial Recognition Technology: Balancing the Benefits and
Concerns, 15 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 363, 365 (2020).
31.
Id.
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country and published a report with the following striking statistics on
the departments’ use of facial recognition technology:
• At least one of four state or local police departments has the
option to run facial recognition searches through their system or
another agency’s system.32
• At least twenty-six states allow law enforcement to run or request
searches on their databases of driver’s license and identification
photos, and these databases primarily contain information
about law-abiding Americans.33
States allow police departments to search databases that
contain information about law-abiding Americans, exposing a
significant transition in law enforcement investigations.34 Police have
traditionally used fingerprint and DNA databases that are composed of
information from criminal arrests and investigations.35 Now they
are using driver’s license databases, tapping into a resource with
information primarily from law-abiding Americans.36 Facial recognition
searches have become routine at the federal and state level.37 The
Georgetown report offers numbers on a few particular facial recognition
systems: Ohio’s system was used 6,618 times by 504 agencies in its
first eight months of operation while the San Diego Association of
Government’s system is used by San Diego agencies for an average of
about 560 searches each month. Pinellas County’s system in Florida is
used to conduct around 8,000 searches per month.38 Further, the
Georgetown report outlines four common ways that police use facial
recognition technology: (1) stop and identify, (2) arrest and identify,
(3) investigate and identify, and (4) real-time video surveillance.39
Despite serious concerns, facial recognition technology has been
useful for law enforcement in criminal case investigations.40 Police have
used facial recognition evidence, along with other evidence, to establish
probable cause for arrest for passport fraud and in identity theft cases.41
The New York Police Department used facial recognition software on a
surveillance image of a shooter in a nightclub to arrest him in 2017.42
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Garvie et al., supra note 22.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See Hamann & Smith, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.

898

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:891

Police were able to narrow down the two hundred likely matches that
the software generated by comparing the images and looking for similar
physical characteristics between them; the department then presented
a photo array to witnesses to identify the shooter.43
While law enforcement agencies are increasingly integrating
facial recognition technology into their daily operations, they are not
implementing sufficient safeguards to ensure the accuracy of their
systems.44 Most law enforcement agencies contract with private
companies that provide facial recognition software. One major facial
recognition company, FaceFirst, publicly advertised a 95 percent
accuracy rate for its facial recognition technology but then expressly
disclaimed liability for failing to meet that threshold in contracts with
the San Diego Association of Governments.45 This raises questions
about the accuracy of the technologies created by these private
companies. Most police departments rely on their officers to verify that
the technology has made an accurate match between the image
submitted to the technology and the image from its database.46
However, a recent study has shown that users make the wrong decision
about a match about half of the time if they have not had specialized
training in facial identification.47
D. Private Facial Recognition Companies
Private companies generally provide law enforcement agencies
with their facial recognition technology. The only public benchmark to
assess the accuracy of facial recognition algorithms is a completely
voluntary competition that the NIST offers every three to four years.48
Private companies are not required to participate in this competition at
all, even if they are selling their facial recognition technology to law
enforcement.49 This evidences a gaping hole in the regulation of private
facial recognition technologies—there are no current standards that
ensure their algorithms are accurate. This is especially concerning
given the bias embedded in facial recognition technology, resulting in
its increased inaccuracy when identifying minority faces.50

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
See Garvie et al., supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See Buolamwini, supra note 12.
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Further, the government does not directly regulate private facial
recognition companies’ data collection that is used to create and train
their algorithms. There are some state laws that indirectly regulate
facial recognition technology, like the Illinois Biometric Information
Privacy Act (BIPA). BIPA implicates facial recognition data in its aim
to protect biometric information in general. However, BIPA does not
specifically address facial recognition technology. BIPA makes it
unlawful for any private entity to “collect, capture, purchase, receive
through trade or otherwise obtain” someone’s biometric identifiers
unless that person is informed.51 BIPA defines “biometric identifier” as
an eye scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, hand scan, or face geometry.52
Clearview AI is a facial recognition company that has contracts
with more than six hundred law enforcement agencies across the
country.53 Clearview has collected data from Facebook, Venmo,
YouTube, and Twitter and amassed three billion images for its facial
recognition technology.54 The invasive nature of this data scraping is
alarming and has led to a number of lawsuits claiming that companies
collecting personal data like this have violated BIPA.55 Specifically, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a suit against Clearview
because of the company’s alleged illegal collection and storage of Illinois
citizens’ faceprints without their knowledge or consent. Further, the
ACLU alleged that Clearview sold the data to private companies and
law enforcement, which enables law enforcement to use this data for
facial recognition purposes.56 Because law enforcement’s use of facial
recognition technology is vastly unregulated, the access that law
enforcement has to large amounts of private data is disturbing.
Other states, such as Texas and Washington, have also enacted
laws to protect biometric information where the federal government has

51.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(b) (West 2020).
52.
Id. 14/10.
53.
CEO of AI Startup Dismisses Critics, CBS THIS MORNING (Feb. 5, 2020),
https://www.cbs.com/shows/cbs_this_morning/video/5EMDCMqNXNddglebBhlvpHYrJUk1lOaw/
ceo-of-controversial-ai-startup-dismisses-critics/ [https://perma.cc/KZ5R-353Z].
54.
Id.
55.
See Nick Statt, ACLU Sues Facial Recognition Firm Clearview AI, Calling It a
‘Nightmare Scenario’ for Privacy, VERGE (May 28, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/5/28/21273388/aclu-clearview-ai-lawsuit-facial-recognition-database-illinois-biometric-laws
[https://perma.cc/634X-D9QB]; Taylor Hatmaker, Lawsuits Allege Microsoft, Amazon and Google
Violated Illinois Facial Recognition Privacy Law, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2020, 4:59 PM),
https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/15/facial-recognition-lawsuit-vance-janecyk-bipa/
[https://perma.cc/7H77-UN7C].
56.
Complaint at 3–4, Am. C.L. Union v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. May 28, 2020); see Statt, supra note 55.
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not.57 These state laws do not regulate facial recognition technology and
its uses, but rather the data itself. Recently, San Francisco became the
first city to ban facial recognition technology use by its state agencies
in May 2019.58 In the findings section of the ordinance, the city
expressed concern that facial recognition technology has the ability to
endanger civil rights in a way that outweighs the benefits of the
technology. According to the ordinance, citizens should have the ability
to live free of continuous government monitoring.59 Further, the
ordinance points out that this technology exacerbates racial injustice
because of the disproportionate accuracy rates for different
demographics.60
E. Congressional Action
Local and state governments are beginning to step in to regulate
where Congress has not. Even though there is a lack of federal
legislation to regulate facial recognition technology, Congress has held
hearings and proposed bills on the subject.61 To date, Congress has not
passed any legislation to regulate facial recognition technology; yet the
amount of legislation congressional members have proposed over recent
years signifies an appetite in the legislature to regulate the problematic
side effects of this technology.
In 2019, the 116th Congress held two hearings on facial
recognition technology.62 As a result, two federal bills were
proposed: the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019
and the Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act.63 The Commercial
Facial Recognition Privacy Act would require businesses to obtain
consent from consumers before employing facial recognition
technology.64 This Act did not specifically address law enforcement. The
Facial Recognition Technology Warrant Act, on the other hand, would
have required law enforcement to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause before using facial recognition technology for ongoing

57.
S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., 116TH CONG., FACIAL RECOGNITION: POTENTIAL AND
RISK (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.rpc.senate.gov/policy-papers/facial-recognition-potential-andrisk [https://perma.cc/LGL2-7TR7].
58.
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE ch. 19B, § 19B.1, ch. 21, § 21.07 (2020).
59.
S.F., Cal., Ordinance 107-19 § 1(d) (May 21, 2019).
60.
Id. § 1(c); see Hill, supra note 1.
61.
S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., supra note 57.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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surveillance.65 Moreover, this Act would have limited surveillance to
thirty days and set additional rules to minimize the data collected on
people outside a warrant.66
In particular, a bill introduced in 2019 called the Justice in
Forensic Algorithms Act targeted issues associated with law
enforcement using forensic algorithms and introducing these
algorithms at trial to condemn a defendant. The bill established
standards and testing requirements for general use of forensic
algorithms and addressed forensic evidence at trial.67 The bill charged
the NIST to establish Computation Forensic Algorithms Standards and
a Computational Forensic Algorithms Testing Program that federal law
enforcement must comply with when using forensic algorithms.68 The
bill outlined the NIST standards to include an assessment for potential
disparate impact on different demographics, requirements for software
testing, requirements for developers’ public disclosure of documentation
about the software (including information about the development
process and its training data), and requirements to provide defendants
with reports that document the use and results of the forensic software
program in their trials.69 NIST’s Testing Program required testing in
accordance with the NIST standards, that testing use realistic data sets
that represent diverse racial and ethnic groups, and that the test
results were published online with specifics about the software’s
performance on diverse populations.70 The bill provided that evidence
from forensic software would only be admissible in a criminal case if the
software were to be submitted to the NIST testing program.71
Further, by proposing that developers cannot assert a trade
secret privilege to block defendants, this bill protected defendants’
access to algorithms’ source codes where the algorithms are used in a
criminal trial.72 The bill created a blanket rule that trade secret
protections do not apply in criminal trials “when defendants would
otherwise be entitled to obtain evidence” by amending the Federal

65.
Id.
66.
Dennis Romboy, Sen. Mike Lee to Police Doing Facial Recognition Surveillance: Get a
Warrant, DESERET NEWS (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:36 PM), https://www.deseret.com/utah/2019/11/14/
20965330/sen-mike-lee-to-police-doing-facial-recognition-surveillance-get-a-warrant
[https://perma.cc/GQT5-UKUV].
67.
See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
68.
See id. § 2.
69.
See id. § 2(a).
70.
See id. § 2(d).
71.
See id. § 2(g).
72.
See id. § 2(a).
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Rules of Evidence.73 Moreover, defendants would receive a report on the
software used in their cases and would be given access to the software
so they can test it.74 Because of the extreme nature of this blanket rule
on trade secret protections, the bill did not gain traction to pass.75
A final piece of federal legislation—the George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act—was proposed on the House Floor in June 2020 to regulate
police departments.76 The bill passed in the House, but did not pass in
the Senate.77 A notable part of this legislation that specifically applied
to facial recognition technology—the Federal Police Camera and
Accountability Act—required police officers to wear body cameras to
conduct their searches and make their arrests but prohibited officers
from equipping or employing facial recognition technology on their body
cameras.78 Further, any footage from their body cameras was not to be
subject to facial recognition technology.79 The proposed bill imposed
broad regulations on police departments to increase transparency and
accountability, with the goal of reducing discriminatory practices.80 The
bill, however, did not pass through the Senate because of partisan
disagreements.81
F. Facial Recognition Evidence at Trial
Facial recognition evidence has not yet been introduced at
trial.82 However, with increasing use of the technology, it is likely that
prosecutors will begin to introduce this technology as evidence to
establish probable cause or as evidence of an individual’s
identification.83 In this context, evidentiary questions will likely emerge
about the scientific reliability of facial recognition technology, which

73.
Id. § 2(b).
74.
Press Release, Mark Takano, House of Representatives, Rep. Takano Introduces the
Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act to Protect Defendants’ Due Process Rights in the Criminal
Justice System (Sept. 17, 2019), https://takano.house.gov/newsroom/press-releases/rep-takano-introduces-the-justice-in-forensic-algorithms-act-to-protect-defendants-due-process-rights-in-thecriminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/7QY7-M7AH].
75.
See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
76.
See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020).
77.
See id.
78.
Id. §§ 372, 374.
79.
Id. § 374.
80.
See H.R. REP. NO. 116-434, at 37–38 (2020).
81.
See Li Zhou & Ella Nilsen, The House Just Passed a Sweeping Police Reform Bill, VOX
(June 25, 2020, 8:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/25/21303005/police-reform-bill-house-democrats-senate-republicans [https://perma.cc/42CS-VSVM].
82.
See Hamann & Smith, supra note 13.
83.
Id.
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must be established under the Frye or Daubert standard before the
evidence is admitted.84
There is an array of issues that arises regarding the reliability
of facial recognition technology evidence. For instance, the technology
has limitations on its accuracy given the conditions of the photos being
analyzed.85 The technology works best when photos are taken head-on
with good lighting and no movement.86 Consequently, the accuracy of
the technology decreases when there is no standardized photo for
comparison or when a photo was taken in an uncontrolled environment,
perhaps from a different angle with low-quality lighting.87 Further, the
evolving nature of faces and appearances affects the accuracy of the
technology because of changes like a new hairstyle, facial hair growth,
weight gain or loss, and aging.88 Many facial recognition systems are
also less accurate when reading faces of certain demographics,
specifically Black people.89
Moreover, the proprietary nature of this technology is
problematic when analyzing whether a facial recognition technology
has been reviewed by other experts in the field.90 Many police
departments contract with private companies that are not willing to
disclose their trade secrets.91 To address these concerns, this Note
conducts an analysis of the reliability of evidence from facial recognition
technology under the Daubert factors.92
II. ANALYSIS
A. Facial Recognition Technology Admissibility as Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs whether an expert
witness’s testimony is admitted into evidence, and was effectively
created, in part, by the Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

84.
Id.
85.
See id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.; Buolamwini, supra note 12; NIST Study, supra note 10.
90.
See John Nawara, Machine Learning: Face Recognition Technology Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 49 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 601, 614 (2011).
91.
Id.
92.
This Note uses the Daubert standard because it is used more frequently than the Frye
standard in many state and federal courts. See Frye Standard, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/frye_standard [https://perma.cc/4CXD-8R6E] (last visited Feb.
23, 2021).
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Pharmaceutical, Inc.93 Because federal courts adhere to Daubert to
assess the reliability of expert evidence, this Note uses the Daubert
factors to analyze the admissibility of results from facial recognition
technology. In Daubert, the Supreme Court established a set of factors
to assess the reliability of scientific expert testimony.94 This new test
was meant to establish a “gatekeeping” role for federal courts in
determining what evidence should be admitted.95 The non-exhaustive
list of factors that the Daubert Court provided are (1) whether the
technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the technique’s known or
ascertainable rate of error; (4) whether there are recognized standards
for using the technique; and (5) whether the technique has been
generally accepted in the relevant specialty scientific fields.96
In subsequent decisions, the Court has clarified that the inquiry
is not about the general validity of the expert’s discipline.97 Rather, the
inquiry is specifically about the reliability of the particular technique
that the expert relies on in his testimony.98 This Note applies this list
of Daubert factors to facial recognition technology to consider whether
this type of evidence should be admitted in trial. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that it should not be admitted into trial as evidence based on
the current state of the technology and the lack of regulation.
1. Factor One: Testability
Facial recognition technology is easily testable.99 In general, it is
much easier to test a mathematical system that takes measurements
and produces results rather than, for example, a sociological theory.100
Facial recognition technology produces results that can easily be shown
to be false. It is possible to create experiments that estimate how likely
a system is to result in false positive or false negative results.101 One
disturbing example of the testability of facial recognition technology
is Google’s recognition system that falsely identified two Black
93.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment; Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
94.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94.
95.
Mohammed Osman & Edward Imwinkelried, Facial Recognition Systems, 50 CRIM. L.
BULL., no. 3, 2014, at 695.
96.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
97.
Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95; see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
98.
Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95.
99.
Id.
100.
See Nawara, supra note 90, at 612.
101.
Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95.
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individuals as gorillas in 2015, resulting in public criticism and outcry
to improve the system.102
Even though facial recognition technology can be easily tested,
there is another aspect of this factor: whether the technology actually
has been tested and what the results were.103 As explored above, there
is no mandatory testing of facial recognition technology.104 The NIST
offers a voluntary facial recognition technology competition, but facial
recognition technology companies are not required by any governing
body to test their technology.105 It is reasonable to think that companies
will proactively test their technology to refine their products, but these
internal test results are not publicly available. It is evident that facial
recognition technology has been tested because of the variety of studies
that have evaluated its accuracy, but this sporadic testing is not
adequate.106
The NIST has published the most comprehensive reports on
tests and evaluations of facial recognition technology. NIST’s Face
Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Program produces studies and reports
on different aspects of the technology.107 Importantly, NIST’s FRVT
program evaluates algorithms that are submitted by research and
development laboratories.108 These algorithms are not necessarily
available as products, but rather are prototypes.109 Therefore, this
testing can only speak to the reliability of facial recognition prototypes,
not the actual technology that is used and implemented.110 This
weakens the claim that facial recognition technology should be
admitted into trial as evidence because the most comprehensive reports
on facial recognition technology and its accuracy test prototypes, not
final products.
Facial recognition technology’s embedded bias is one particular
concern that has arisen as a result of testing the technology.111 Part 3
of the NIST FRVT program evaluated the accuracy of facial recognition
102.
Nutter, supra note 28, at 933.
103.
Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95.
104.
See discussion supra Section I.D.
105.
See Garvie et al., supra note 22.
106.
See NIST Study, supra note 10; Buolamwini, supra note 12.
107.
See Face Recognition Vender Test (FRVT), NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH.,
https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-recognition-vendor-test-frvt [https://perma.cc/8U8VEXE2] (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).
108.
PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC
EFFECTS 1 (2019), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280 [https://perma.cc/8VSA-4WRW].
109.
Id.
110.
See id.
111.
See id. at 4, 14–15; Buolamwini, supra note 12.
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algorithms with different demographic groups.112 The study tested
algorithms from the majority of the industry and found that algorithms
generated higher rates of false positives for Black faces—sometimes up
to one hundred times more false identifications—than white faces.113
Even though the accuracy of facial recognition technology will improve
over time, the current bias in these systems is concerning and weakens
the claim that it should be allowed into trial as evidence.
2. Factor Two: Peer Review and Publication
There is no question that there is an abundance of literature on
facial recognition technology. The scientific community has written
about this technology and explored its uses and applications. However,
the proprietary nature of facial recognition technology raises questions
about the level of scrutiny applied to it.114 Because police departments
contract with private companies for facial recognition technology, there
are concerns about how meaningfully the academic community can
feasibly analyze these companies’ technologies without access to the
inner workings of the software.115 This concern cuts against admitting
facial recognition technology as evidence because disclosure of the
technology’s source code is necessary to evaluate the reliability of the
technology.116
3. Factor Three: Rate of Error
There are two different error rates to consider with facial
recognition technology.117 The first error rate is described with the
embedded bias of the technology: the error rate with respect to training
data.118 This error rate leads to increased performance over time by
using machine learning and better data to train the algorithm.119 The
second error rate is the inaccuracy that ensues when an algorithm is
unleashed in the real world with unknown conditions where photos may
not be taken in the standard way that the algorithm has been trained.120
There may be poor lighting, or the photo may be taken from an angle
112.
GROTHER ET AL., supra note 108, at 30–33.
113.
NIST Study, supra note 10.
114.
See Nawara, supra note 90.
115.
Id.
116.
See Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal
Defendants, and the Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 215–19 (2017).
117.
Nutter, supra note 28, at 933.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
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without a full view of the subject’s face.121 Further, a particular error
rate may not speak to the technology’s accuracy when it is applied to a
person who does not share characteristics with the initial training
data.122 As mentioned above, facial recognition technology is frequently
trained on data sets that are not diverse.123 Therefore, the technology’s
error rate may be much higher when applied to an individual of color.124
It is difficult to judge the most accurate error rate because of the
different possible error rates that may be reported and the variability
of error rates when applied to subjects with different appearances.125 A
technology with a nondiverse data set may be fairly accurate when
applied to a white individual. However, when it is applied to a Black
individual, it is doubtful that the expert has complied with FRE 702(d)
and “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.”126
4. Factor Four: Standards
There are no standards set out to control the development and
operation of facial recognition technology.127 Companies develop their
own facial recognition technology and keep their information to
themselves.128 Therefore, standards have not developed in this industry
and this is problematic for facial recognition systems.129 This factor is
straightforward because there are no published standards for facial
recognition technology, and this factor weakens the argument that
facial recognition technology evidence should be admitted into trial as
evidence.130
5. Factor Five: General Acceptance
Machine learning is generally accepted,131 and there is an array
of facial recognition protocols and tests that has also been generally
accepted in the scientific community.132 However, the proprietary
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See id. at 931–34.
Id. at 934.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 934– 35.
Id. at 935.
See Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Nutter, supra note 28, at 933.
See Nawara, supra note 90, at 615–16.
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nature of this technology is, again, concerning; the particular methods
for the evidence introduced are not disclosed by the private companies
who own this technology.133
Under the five Daubert factors alone, it is unlikely that results
from facial recognition technology will be allowed into evidence at
trial.134 These five factors, however, do not constitute an exhaustive
list; courts may consider other factors when evaluating the
admissibility of expert witness testimony. Therefore, even if the results
from facial recognition technology would not be admissible under the
five factors listed in Daubert, courts may nonetheless admit these
results into evidence.135 If results from facial recognition technology are
admitted into evidence, the defendant has the right to challenge and
cross-examine.136
B. Contestability of Facial Recognition Technology Evidence
Just because evidence has been deemed “reliable” under the
Daubert inquiry does not mean that the evidence is correct.137 The
Daubert factors ask about the reliability of the scientific expert’s
methodology in reaching a conclusion, but the correctness of the
conclusion itself must be evaluated in the adversarial process.138 Legal
scholars refer to cross-examination as the “greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth.”139 Thus, defendants have a
significant interest in contesting evidence from a facial recognition
technology system that could be inaccurate.140

133.
Id. at 614.
134.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
135.
See Osman & Imwinkelried, supra note 95.
136.
Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1375 & n.166 (2018) (stating that the FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee’s note to the 2000 amendment observes “that ‘rejection of expert testimony is
the exception rather than the rule’ and that the court’s gatekeeper function should not substitute
for the role of the adversary system”).
137.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) (“Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”).
138.
Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing
Controversy over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 119
(2017).
139.
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 5 EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H.
Chabourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1974).
140.
See Rebecca Wexler, Convicted by Code, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2015, 12:28 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2015/10/defendants-should-be-able-to-inspect-software-code-used-inforensics.html [https://perma.cc/BVF3-NDPK].
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The Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause states that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.”141 In practice, this clause
requires witnesses to be present at trial to be cross-examined so that
the defendant may confront his accuser.142 Given a defendant’s right to
confront his accuser, this policy favors giving defendants the right to
challenge the source code of the facial recognition technology because it
is the processes of the technology that generate the condemning result.
1. Defendant’s Right to Cross-Examine Facial Recognition Source
Code
The foundation of our adversarial system relies on
cross-examining human witnesses; this traditional system of
confrontation has not, to date, caught up with the standardization of
technology in our society.143 New technologies present “process-based”
evidence which is dependent on a machine using its standardized
processes.144 Rather than confronting lay and expert witnesses,
defendants are often challenged with confronting machine witnesses.
This is starkly different from the typical eyewitness testimony for which
the confrontation clause was designed. Therefore, the reliability of
machine witnesses demands a different type of analysis.145
The Supreme Court held in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
that certified forensic lab reports are testimonial evidence and are
inadmissible unless accompanied by a lab technician who can certify
and attest to the validity of the report.146 As a result of this holding,
a forensic technician must testify in court and be subject to
cross-examination.147 However, the confrontation clause may not be
satisfied by a lab technician testifying on behalf of a process-based
technology.148 The appropriate target of cross-examination is the
standardized process, not the lab technician.149 The process itself, not
the technician’s observations or negligible involvement, accuses the
defendant.150
141.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
142.
Edward K. Cheng & G. Alexander Nunn, Beyond the Witness: Bringing a Process
Perspective to Modern Evidence Law, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1093 (2019).
143.
See id. at 1092–93.
144.
Id. at 1088–89.
145.
Cf. id.
146.
Id. at 1094; Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308, 311, 329 (2009).
147.
Cheng & Nunn, supra note 142, at 1094–95.
148.
See id. at 1095.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.

910

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:4:891

Defendants have a right to challenge the evidence presented
against them in a meaningful way. Thus, it is important to think about
the specifics of challenging facial recognition technology evidence.
Source code is the “heart” of a computer program.151 This code contains
all the instructions for the technology to operate, dictates which tasks
it will perform, and determines how it will perform them.152 Gaining
access to the technology’s source code would be the most meaningful
way for the defendant to challenge facial recognition technology because
it would reveal information about the algorithm’s inner workings that
private companies keep to themselves.153
Having access to the source code of a program is comparable to
“looking under the hood” of a car, which is distinct from watching a car
drive.154 While someone can learn limited details from observing a
moving vehicle, the observer cannot understand the true inner
workings of a car without looking under the hood.155 The Volkswagen
cheating scandal is particularly illustrative. In 2015, Volkswagen
admitted that it had rigged its software—its secret code—so that its
diesel cars would pass emissions tests when they actually did not meet
the EPA’s requirements.156 The people who inspected Volkswagen’s cars
had no idea that the software’s pollution-control equipment kicked in
only during inspections.157 The software took cues from the position of
the steering wheel, the speed of the vehicle, and how long the engine
was running to detect an ongoing inspection and then turned on the
pollution-control mechanism.158 The inspectors were able to watch the
car drive, but they were oblivious to the deceitful inner workings of the
proprietary software.159 It is the same for computer programs and
technologies; an observer learns limited information from watching the
program in action.160 The source code is necessary to know about the
technology’s processes.161
A secret algorithm that offers a condemning result is like
evidence offered by an anonymous expert, whom a defendant cannot
151.
Imwinkelried, supra note 138, at 98.
152.
Id. at 98–99.
153.
Chessman, supra note 116, at 182– 83.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Jim Dwyer, Volkswagen’s Diesel Fraud Makes Critic of Secret Code a Prophet, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/23/nyregion/volkswagens-diesel-fraudmakes-critic-of-secret-code-a-prophet.html [https://perma.cc/6Q2A-3Y5L].
157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159.
See id.
160.
Chessman, supra note 116, at 182–83.
161.
See id.
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cross-examine.162 The confrontation clause clearly provides defendants
the right to cross-examine their accusers; accordingly, defendants
should have access to the source code of the technologies that accuse
them.163
However, facial recognition technology and its processes are
proprietary in nature. Private companies do not disclose the processes
and intricacies of their technology because they are competing in a
marketplace with other companies. Therefore, a facial recognition
company claiming its source code to be a trade secret to avoid disclosing
it to the court is a foreseeable obstacle for defendants who may want to
challenge results from facial recognition technology.
2. Developers’ Trade Secret Privilege
The rationale behind allowing companies to invoke a trade
secret privilege is to encourage innovation and to discourage unfair
business practices.164 For a company, the first step in successfully
invoking the trade secret privilege is to show that one has a valid trade
secret under the jurisdictional requirements.165 In the context of
criminal cases, there is a lower likelihood that criminal defendants will
have the resources to challenge a claimant’s asserted privilege.166
Therefore, it is safer for companies to assert the privilege in the
criminal context, and companies are more likely to overclaim the
privilege where there is no true trade secret.167 Overclaiming becomes
problematic and harmful to the administration of criminal justice
because courts frequently deny defendants’ discovery of a company’s
claimed trade secret.168 This prevents defendants from gaining access
to the inner workings of a company’s technology—specifically the source
code—which is needed for a defendant to meaningfully confront the
witnesses that testify against him.169
Developers have already used the trade secret privilege to
block defendants from gaining access to the source code of their
162.
Frank Pasquale, Secret Algorithms Threaten the Rule of Law, MIT TECH. REV. (June
1, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/06/01/151447/secret-algorithms-threaten-therule-of-law/#:~:text=Sending%20people%20to%20jail%20because,program%20undermines%20
our%20legal%20system.&text=Predicting%20and%20shaping%20what%20you,business%20for
%20data%2Ddriven%20firms [https://perma.cc/KW8D-MVCW].
163.
See Cheng & Nunn, supra note 142.
164.
Wexler, supra note 136, at 1356.
165.
Id. at 1396.
166.
Id. at 1397.
167.
Id.
168.
See id. at 1397–98.
169.
See Chessman, supra note 116, at 183; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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technologies.170 For example, a California defendant was denied access
to a forensic software’s source code used to convict him of murder
because the software developer claimed trade secret privilege.171 The
technology was a statistical tool that was used to calculate the
likelihood that the defendant’s DNA was in a sample from the crime
scene.172 A California trial court had ordered the developer to disclose
the source code because the defendant’s right to confront and
cross-examine a witness would be denied without it.173 However, the
California Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held for the developer
concluding that the trade secret privilege applied in this criminal
trial.174
Granting trade secret privilege in the criminal context can be
problematic and raises concerns about the administration of justice.
When evaluating whether to grant trade secret privilege to a company,
a court’s first consideration is whether the alleged trade secret is valid
and whether ordering its disclosure would cause harm.175
Moreover, courts generally also weigh the risk of harm resulting
from the disclosure against the need for the protected information.176
Using this balancing test is problematic because it places a company’s
financial interests on the same level as a criminal defendant’s life and
liberty, which should be valued more heavily.177 Further, the way that
courts have generally applied this test in the criminal context suggests
that intellectual property owners are prioritized over defendants in the
criminal justice system.178 Ultimately, defendants have a right to
confront their accuser under the confrontation clause; using the trade
secret privilege to prevent defendants from gaining access to the source
code and inner workings of the technology that condemns them impedes
the administration of justice.
Additionally, it is unnecessary for developers to invoke the trade
secret privilege because there are already procedural safeguards in
place to limit the defendant’s access to protected information through

170.
See People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *3, *7, *9–10
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).
171.
Id.; Wexler, supra note 136, at 1358.
172.
Chubbs, 2015 WL 139069, at *1; Wexler, supra note 136, at 1358.
173.
Chubbs, 2015 WL 139069, at *4; Wexler, supra note 136, at 1358.
174.
Chubbs, 2015 WL 139069, at *10; Wexler, supra note 136, at 1358–59.
175.
Wexler, supra note 136, at 1396.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. at 1401–02 (discussing the “group value model” that Allan Lind and Tom Tyler
developed in their book, E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 228–40 (1998)).
178.
Id.
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criminal discovery and subpoena procedures.179 Courts can deny
frivolous or abusive motions for discovery, and they can also grant
protective orders to guard the trade secrets at issue.180
Ultimately, the rationale for the trade secret privilege—to
encourage innovation and prevent unfair business practices—cannot
justify a blanket trade secret privilege in the criminal justice system.181
Criminal defendants are unlikely to be competitors of the private
companies creating facial recognition technology; and therefore, the
trade secret privilege should not be available to completely block
defendants from access to the inner workings of the software.182
However, it is worth noting that companies have an interest in
protecting their information because defendants could be careless with
it. It is foreseeable that a company’s competitor in the marketplace
could bribe a criminal defendant to disclose protected information that
the defendant accesses during trial. Yet, given the seriousness of a
criminal charge, on balance, criminal defendants who have been
incriminated by evidence from facial recognition technology should
have the right to challenge this evidence by accessing the source code
and “looking under the hood” of these technologies, with possible
protections for developers and their technology.
3. Challenging Facial Recognition Technology Evidence
If evidence from facial recognition technology is admitted into
court, there are a variety of defenses that a defendant can invoke to bar
the admission of the evidence. If granted access to the source code that
provides insight into the inner workings of the technology, defendants
can present arguments about the accuracy of the technology, the
accuracy of the specific test that was run, and whether the test should
have been run at all.
First, defendants can assert that the technology itself may be
embedded with bias. On cross, a criminal defendant can expose issues
in the way the algorithm was trained. These issues indicate the
algorithm’s poor performance with particular demographics and
potentially an incorrect identification in the defendant’s case.183 As

179.
Id. at 1403.
180.
Id.
181.
Id. at 1356.
182.
See id. (explaining that the underlying rationales of trade secret law do not justify a
privilege that protects trade secrets from people who will never be business competitors).
183.
See NIST Study, supra note 10; Hill, supra note 1.
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mentioned above, studies have shown that facial recognition technology
performs worse on Black subjects.184
Further, the photo that was used to run a facial recognition test
may be challenged. As mentioned above,185 facial recognition technology
works best when a photo is taken head-on with good lighting and
no movement.186 However, when the technology is unleashed in
uncontrolled circumstances, photos are taken from different angles
with different lighting that could lead to less accurate results.187
Moreover, a person’s evolving appearance can lead to less accurate
results due to newly grown facial hair, weight gain or loss, or aging.188
The use of facial recognition technology can also be challenged
as an “unreasonable search” under the Fourth Amendment.189 While
protections against facial recognition searches have not yet been
established in this context, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence
suggests that certain protections exist against unfettered monitoring of
citizens’ whereabouts.190 Facial recognition technology can be used to
monitor the location of a person. Because this government action is
particularly intrusive, the use of this technology could be challenged on
Fourth Amendment grounds. In the 2012 United States v. Jones
decision, the Court held that installing a GPS tracking device on an
automobile and using it to track the vehicle’s movements for an
extended amount of time was a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.191 Justice Alito wrote in his concurring opinion that
“society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others
would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor
and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very
long period.”192 Further, in 2018, the Supreme Court held in Carpenter
v. United States that accessing cell phone records for the purpose of
obtaining the location of the device constituted a Fourth Amendment
search and a probable-cause search warrant was needed to gain access
184.
See NIST Study, supra note 10.
185.
See discussion supra Section I.F.
186.
Hamann & Smith, supra note 13.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
190.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (holding that installing a GPS
tracking device on a vehicle and using it to track the vehicle’s movements for an extended period
of time constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2221, 2223 (2018) (holding that accessing historical cell phone records for purposes of
obtaining the geolocation of the device constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, and
accessing them requires a probable-cause search warrant).
191.
565 U.S. at 404.
192.
Id. at 430.
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to such records.193 Therefore, defendants can use existing case law to
challenge law enforcement’s use of facial recognition technology to
monitor their location as a Fourth Amendment search requiring a
probable-cause search warrant.194
III. SOLUTION
Based on the Daubert analysis in Part II,195 this Note
recommends that results from facial recognition technology should not
be admitted into evidence based on the current state of the technology.
Moreover, this Note recommends that Congress pass a law to grant
defendants access to the software’s source code if the software’s results
are admitted in their trials, with possible protections for the software
developer’s information.
A. Admissibility
The Daubert factors will guide federal judges’ analysis when
results from facial recognition technology are introduced in court.
Results from facial recognition technology should not be admitted into
evidence at trial because of the current lack of testing of facial
recognition technology, the absence of meaningful peer review due to
the proprietary nature of the technology, the difficulty in calculating an
error rate, the shortage of industry standards, and the lack of
meaningful general acceptance in the scientific community.196 However,
if standards or a testing protocol were established in this industry—as
proposed in the Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of 2019—then the
Daubert analysis would evolve, and the evidence may be perceived as
more reliable.197 This would likely lead to admissions of evidence from
193.
138 S. Ct. at 2221, 2223.
194.
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221, 2223; Garvie et al., supra
note 22.
195.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
196.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
197.
See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019). The proposed bill charges the NIST to
establish Computation Forensic Algorithms Standards and a Computational Forensic Algorithms
Testing Program that federal law enforcement must comply with when using forensic algorithms.
Id. The NIST standards would include an assessment for potential for disparate impact on
different demographics, requirements for software testing, requirements for developers’ public
disclosure of documentation about the software (including information about the development
process and its training data), and requirements to provide defendants with reports that document
the use and results of the forensic software program in their trials. Id. NIST’s Testing Program
would require testing in accordance with the NIST standards, that testing use realistic data sets
that represent diverse racial and ethnic groups, and that the test results are published online with
specifics about the software’s performance on diverse populations. Id. § 2(d). The bill provides that
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facial recognition technology. However, the current state of the industry
suggests that results from facial recognition technology should not be
admitted in federal court.
B. Contestability
Congress should adopt a law where criminal defendants are
granted access to the results from forensic software used in their cases,
access to the software itself, and access to the software’s source code to
challenge the evidence presented against them.198 Further, Congress
should allow developers to continue to claim trade secret privilege, but
it should not block defendants from accessing the software. Instead,
judges should make a case-by-case determination on how to best protect
a developer’s trade secret while also granting criminal defendants the
right to access this critical source code.
For example, the proposed Justice in Forensic Algorithms Act of
2019 would protect defendants’ access to the algorithms’ source code by
ensuring developers cannot assert a trade secret privilege to block
defendants’ access.199 The bill creates a blanket rule that trade secret
protections do not apply in criminal trials “when defendants would
otherwise be entitled to obtain evidence” by amending the Federal
Rules of Evidence.200 Further, the proposed bill provides that
defendants would receive a report on the software used in their cases
and would be given access to the software so they can test it.201 The
extreme nature of this blanket ban on trade secret protections made the
bill unlikely to pass.202
This Note supports the general spirit of this bill—ensuring that
defendants obtain access to the software and its source code to challenge
the evidence used against them. This proposed bill is problematic,
however, because it disincentivizes innovation. If developers know that
their trade secrets could be available to opposing parties in litigation at
any time, the incentive to innovate and improve their products will be
diminished. Their competitive advantage is eliminated if opposing
parties gain full access to the developer’s trade secrets and then disclose
that information to competitors or to the public. Further, the proposal
does not adequately weigh the intellectual property interests of the
evidence from forensic software would only be admissible in a criminal case if the software was
submitted to the NIST testing program. Id. § 2(g)(1).
198.
Cf. Chessman, supra note 116, at 183; Imwinkelried, supra note 138, at 126–27.
199.
See H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
200.
Id. § 2(b).
201.
Takano, supra note 74.
202.
See generally H.R. 4368, 116th Cong. (2019).
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companies. Instead of a blanket rule against a trade secret privilege, a
more nuanced solution would better balance the competing interests at
issue. This Note proposes a middle-ground approach: developers may
invoke the trade secret privilege in criminal cases, but they cannot
categorically block the defendant’s access to the software.
In practice, a court would first issue an order specifying the
conditions under which the defendant can have access to the company’s
software and documentation. The company would be responsible for
enforcing the court-ordered protections for its software. After giving the
defendant access to this information, it would be up to defendant’s
counsel to closely scrutinize the software and its inner workings.
Defendant’s counsel may consider hiring an expert to assist in
understanding the technology’s source code. While this may be costly
for the defendant, this solution provides criminal defendants with an
opportunity to meaningfully confront their accusers.
This approach would leave the door open for judges to provide
protection for the developer. For instance, after giving defendants
access to the software’s source code, the judge could decide that its
disclosure is subject to a protective order.203 For example, courts
have required disclosure subject to protective orders with varying
constraints: the experts granted access are subject to vetting; the
experts sign a declaration to acknowledge their obligation not to
circulate the protected information; the experts are allowed to study the
information exclusively in secure areas; and the experts have to conduct
their analysis on protected computers.204 These types of provisions
ensure protection for the developer and also give the defendant access
to the software so the defendant can meaningfully challenge the
evidence presented against him. This solution does not always require
protective orders because it is possible that, in some cases, the threat of
private information disclosure is so low that it does not outweigh the
costs associated with enforcing a protective order. As demonstrated, a
case-by-case approach is the best solution for deciding what protections
are granted to developers that avoid treading on a defendant’s right to
confrontation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note cautions against admitting results from facial
recognition technology into evidence at trial based on the current
infancy and bias of the technology. Further, if the evidence is admitted,
203.
204.

See Imwinkelried, supra note 138, at 127.
See id.
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defendants should have access to the software’s source code to
meaningfully challenge the evidence presented against them under
the confrontation clause. This Note recognizes the developers’ interest
in protecting trade secrets and argues that judges should make
case-by-case determinations about how to protect developers’
information without blocking defendants’ access to the software.
Because of the current bias of facial recognition software and its
disparate accuracy in identifying different demographics, it is
important to critically analyze the state of the technology and the
industry before allowing it to be admitted into evidence at trial. This
Note presents a call to action to examine law enforcement’s use of
facial recognition technology and to prevent unreliable uses from
incriminating defendants without an opportunity for these defendants
to exercise their constitutional right to confront the algorithm that
accuses them.
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